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THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT LITIGATOR:
A VIEW FROM THE JURY BOX
Bruce A. Green*
Karen Bergreen* *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the professional role and
responsibilities of criminal prosecutors.' Prosecutors are considered
ethically and professionally exceptional.2 Courts and the profession
expect more from them than from lawyers for private parties: We expect
prosecutors to "seek justice." 3
Our subject, however, is the role and responsibilities of the
government's trial lawyers in the civil arena. Less has been said on this
* Louis Stein Professor and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law.
** Karen Bergreen, a recovering lawyer, is a stand up comic and author of the novel,
Following Polly. In her former career, she clerked for The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr.
when he was a district court judge. She was also an associate at Winston & Strawn. This is her first
law review Article.
1. See, e.g., R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (2005); ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007); BENNETT L.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 2008); PETER A. JOY & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL,
Do No WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE LAWYERS (2009); Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of
Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. I ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is
decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and
to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.").
3. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."); Bruce A.
Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
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subject. There is disagreement about whether government lawyers in
civil litigation have exceptional obligations comparable to those of
prosecutors. Those who think civil government lawyers must "seek
justice" generally focus on lawyers with exceptional responsibilitiesfor example, solicitors general, government lawyers bringing civil
enforcement proceedings, or government lawyers pursuing litigation to
promote a public "cause."4
To make the case that government lawyers in civil litigation have a
role comparable to the quasi-judicial role of a criminal prosecutor, one
would probably not focus on lawyers who defend the city in gardenvariety personal injury cases. The work of the city's tort lawyers seems
essentially the same as that of lawyers who defend private clients in
personal injury cases. But that is the example on which we focus.
Neither of us has ever been a city lawyer. We draw on different
experience-that of fellow jurors in an action by a tenant in a New York
City-owned building who claimed that she was injured one evening
when the bathroom ceiling fell on her head.
One of us, Karen Bergreen, is a stand-up comedian, novelist, and
teacher. She regards herself as a recovered lawyer, having received a law
degree from the University of Minnesota, served as a federal law clerk,
and practiced briefly in New York fifteen years ago. The other, Bruce
Green, is a legal ethics professor at Fordham Law School. Although we
do not put aside our experiences in legal practice, the principal
perspective we bring to the subject is that of jurors who spent more than
a week observing a New York City government lawyer in operation. We
were asked to bring our common sense and everyday experience, not any
specialized training or knowledge, to the juror's role. So together with
six other jurors, we watched the work of the other players, including the
city's lawyer, in an ordinary, common sense way. Our thesis is that, even
from an ordinary public perspective, more should be expected of
government litigators, even in the most unexciting case, than is expected
of lawyers for private clients. Unlike prosecutors, government civil
litigators may not be considered exceptional, but they should be.
We proceed in several parts. First, Karen tells the story of the trial.
Second, we raise and respond to possible questions about our project's
legitimacy: Does it matter what the public expects of the city's trial
lawyers and, in any event, can two lawyers infer anything about public
expectations from their experience as jurors in a single case? Finally,

4. See Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 457, 480-86 (2009) (discussing government
attorneys' use of "law and the legal system to effectuate broad-based social change").
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having persuaded at least ourselves that this project has some legitimacy,
we reflect on civil government lawyering based on our experience.
II.

A JUROR'S TALE

"Smoking's goodfor you. It's relaxing."
That was the professional opinion of the city's medical expert in the
case of Ms. Tenant v. The City of New York,5 tried in New York State
Supreme Court in July of 2009.
With wisdom like this, it's not hard to imagine how the trial made
those of us on the jury feel. Not just as jurors, but as taxpayers. We went
into our jury service with the expectation that we were doing something
important, and that we were valued. Once we reported for jury duty we
were praised for showing up. We were told that we were an integral part
of the legal process. A judge showed up in a robe and gave us a pep talk;
we learned about the jury's role by watching a film starring Ed Bradley
and Diane Sawyer with bonus clips from Perry Mason. Without us
jurors, disputes might be resolved with flogging. It appeared that the
court wanted to make our job as painless as possible: there were coffee
and snacks just outside the door, free Wi-Fi and access to laptops, and
the finest air conditioning of any pre-war building in the city.
We felt important and well taken care of.
That would all change.
Within an hour of service, the first case was called. Thirty-two of us
were called in for voir dire in Ms. Tenant v. The City of New York.
Plaintiffs attorney briefly introduced himself and informed us that his
client, Ms. Tenant, was injured when a part of the ceiling fell on her in a
New York City-owned building.
We were slotted to be fifteenth and twenty-first in line for
questioning and were both fairly certain that a jury would be picked well
before it was our turn. Moreover, even if the lawyers did select us, the
case seemed simple enough. There was no reason we would not be out
of there in two, at most three, days.
But the voir dire alone took two days. First, we were given about
twenty minutes to fill out a form regarding our employment and our
brushes with the legal system. The lawyers then took a long lunch break
to review the forms.
The questioning began in a small, windowless room in the
courtroom, outside the judge's presence-although the lawyers could
(and frequently did) run down the hall to ask the judge to resolve
5. To spare them any potential embarrassment, we have opted to use pseudonyms for the
plaintiff and lawyers in the case.
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disagreements. Plaintiffs attorney took extensive breaks in between the
utterance of each word he spoke. Every time a question was answered,
he needed to consult with his myriad papers for a reason that remains a
mystery to us. He was suspicious of all the potential jurors-the
newsman, the architectural preservationist, and the student. "Do you
own or rent?," he asked each of us, his voice as portentous as if
Beethoven were providing the score to this query. With the exception of
juror numero siete, who spoke no English, everyone seemed qualified to
serve.
Once the plaintiffs attorney finished questioning the first sixteen
possible jurors, it was the government's turn to ask questions. The
Assistant Corporation Counsel, obviously a veteran attorney, introduced
herself as Ms. L. and then introduced her rookie associate. Until she
spoke, our only impression of her was that she was as bored as we were.
She initially conveyed empathy with us regarding plaintiffs counsel's
dithering, assuring us that her questions would be brief. Instead of using
questions to put forth her theory of the case, she asked if we could be
fair. She asked what books and magazines we read. At first, we were
charmed by her initial venture into efficiency. But, looking back, we
realize that the city's lawyer asked general questions only because she
knew nothing about the specifics of the case. Not to mention, she hadn't
heard of any of the books, despite the fact they were classics and
bestsellers.
Her voir dire strategy was to weed out any one of us who may have
had an agenda: The landmark preservationist may have had her own
ideas about the manner in which the ceiling fell; the newspaper reporter
might have wanted to stick it to the city.
Really? In a personal injury case? It would never have occurred to
us to want to stick it to the city. We live here by choice. We love it.
Ms. L. seemed bent on finding personal hidden agendas.
"Doctor," she asked a doctor, "would you be able to listen to the
testimony of medical professionals, and even though you are a doctor,
give it no more weight than it deserves?"
"I'm not sure," the doctor responded. It was unclear whether she
knew this was her ticket out of the room or she, like us, had no idea what
this question meant.
Out of the presence of the other jurors, the city's lawyer asked me if
as a former lawyer, I would take my hostility out on lawyers during trial.
This, despite the fact that I indicated on the questionnaire that I was
married to a lawyer and had served on a jury once before.
Most of the jury pool caught on. This was not the kind of case for
which you would want to be selected. This was nothing like Perry
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Mason. It was more like Survivor, except in reverse. The idea was to get
voted out of the room. The jurors saw that Ms. L. was giving them an
out. At first, they simply hinted at unconscious biases, but as the voir
dire spiraled into a complex interplay of boredom and incompetence, the
jurors became bolder about carrying out their escape plans.
Ms. L. suggested to us that the plaintiff would potentially have a
problem proving her case-clearly a guess, as Ms. L. had seemingly
done no work in preparing for it. She asked something along the lines of,
"If there isn't any evidence on something-maybe the plaintiff has to
prove something, but there is no testimony about it-will you agree not
to assume something happened if there isn't proof?," but even more
opaque, convoluted, and ungrammatical. The first two agreed, "Yes,
yes," but a third, slyer, more motivated (or attentive) juror said, "I'm not
sure."
On the one hand, he was simply being honest-he could not agree,
because he could not understand the question (besides which, if there
were no direct testimony, he still might be able to draw an inference
from circumstantial evidence or make assumptions based on how people
ordinarily behave). On the other hand, he had found his special way of
saying, "Don't pick me. I am trouble."
By the end of the day, the lawyers had settled on the six jurors and
one alternate. All they needed was one more alternate and the case
would be good to go.
Surely, it would start the next morning.
But the jury administrator, who knew better, told the seven jurors
not to show up until 12:30 the following day, and that proved to be too
soon. Alas, it took seven hours to select the alternate. Again, Ms. L. kept
reminding the jurors that they might not be fair. They took the bait. By
day two, there were no more hints, no more pauses. The members of the
pool were terrified. Hints would not be enough to ensure relief. Every
member except one of that jury pool said he or she could not be fair. The
math teacher said she could not be fair because she was in a car accident,
a college student could not be fair because her mother was a lawyer, and
an entrepreneur could not be fair because he knew about numbers. The
others may have been shirking their duties and lying to get out of jury
service, but more likely they may have simply wanted out of this
particular case, and the government lawyer was giving them their ticket.
Those of us ultimately selected for the jury included an English
professor, a kindergarten teacher, a college student, and a
pharmaceutical executive. We all had busy schedules, some of us
making rushed phone calls and sending breathless text messages during
our breaks, others navigating childcare concerns.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5

888

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:883

When our names were called, the two of us felt the minor dread that
accompanies any time-consuming, low-paying, and slightly boring
project, but we also had some degree of excitement. After all, the case
had the potential of being juicy. And as a law professor and former
lawyer, we had a sense of pride in our profession.
Lucky for us, we thought, that the Assistant Corporation Counsel
was representing the city. Regardless of whether the plaintiffs counsel
was a skilled attorney or a clich6 buffoon, the city's lawyer would guide
us through the case. We had only known government attorneys to be
excellent lawyers-thoroughly prepared, fair, and dynamic in the
courtroom.
Or so we thought.
Okay, so finally it is day three of service. In federal proceedings
where voir dire takes place in the courtroom and the judge asks the
questions, this case could have been wrapped up by now. But the
lawyers spent nearly the whole day making opening statements.
Plaintiffs lawyer told us in as many words and pauses as possible that
his client was hit and injured by the fallen ceiling in an apartment
building owned by New York City. He added that the plaintiffs quality
of life had deteriorated. In response, the city's lawyer opened with a
reminder to keep an open mind and suggested as she had at the onset of
voir dire that somehow the city was not responsible for the maintenance
of its own buildings because those buildings were overseen by the
building's tenant association.
We were ready for our first witness. At least we would hear what
happened to the plaintiff. Instead, we heard from an employee of the
city's housing department, a supervisor of the department's Tenant
Interim Lease ("TIL") program. The program allows renters of city
apartments collectively to become owners of the apartments after the
tenant association demonstrates its capacity to take over responsibility
for running the building.6 Meanwhile, the TIL program trains the tenants
for this responsibility, allowing them to take increasing responsibility.
Eventually, if the exercise in self-governance succeeds, the association is
allowed to purchase the building for $250 per apartment.7 The witness
supervised the tenant association in Ms. Tenant's building and in a
number of other city-owned buildings participating in the program.
We imagine he was initially slated to testify for the city but, when
deposed, turned out to be such a horrendous city representative that the
6. New York City Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., Rehabilitation Tenant Interim Lease
Apartment Purchase Program, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/developers/til.shtml (last visited
Aug. 21, 2010).
7. Id.
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plaintiffs lawyer could not resist calling him as the plaintiffs own
witness to suggest how poorly the city operated its buildings. We
imagine he was initially put on the city's witness list to say, as Ms. L.
suggested in her opening statement, that this case is between the tenant
association and the plaintiff, but not the city and the plaintiff.
But that is not what happened.
He was very defensive. We learned that he was deposed some time
ago and that he may have given answers that inadvertently helped Ms.
Tenant. Fixing the ceiling would have cost less than $2000; the city
wanted him to say that repairs costing less than $2000 were up to the
tenant association. But it seems that he may have said in his deposition
that the city, not the tenant association, was responsible for repairs in
excess of $500. Perhaps the city's lawyer reprimanded him for providing
these answers, which he suddenly appeared to disavow. He said that he
was an honorable man, several times. It became clear that he was
incapable of giving a simple answer to a simple, yes-or-no question.
Initially, the judge was patient. The plaintiffs lawyer asked for an
instruction that the witness answer the questions, but the judge
concluded that he evidently had his "unique" style of speaking and the
lawyer would have to accept that. Soon, however, the judge's patience
thinned, her eyes began to roll as the clock ticked closer to 5:00 p.m.,
when the trial day was expected to end, and she asked him repeatedly to
keep his answers brief and respond to the actual questions. Although the
judge had admonished us at the start of the trial to refrain from
discussing the case, we all nonverbally expressed to one another our
confusion as to the purpose served by this testimony.
What had we learned? Evidently, the supervisor had no knowledge
that repairs were needed. That was about it. A few days later, the city
introduced a witness who said that the tenant association was responsible
for repairs of over $500. There was also a handbook and a document, but
we never saw either. The issue of whether the city was relieved of
anything based on the existence of the tenant association seemed flimsy.
The tenant association came off as a non-entity-perhaps charged with
floor sweeping or litter policy but surely not the structural integrity of
the ceiling. In any event, what difference did it make? If the tenant
association acted as the city's agent, as we were told, would its failure to
maintain the building really relieve the city of liability and shift it to the
tenant association?
We could feel a collective sigh of relief when this witness was
released. And looking back on it, if the city had done its homework, we
might never have had to hear from the city representative in the first
place-and certainly not at such length. The case was about the tenant
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and her apartment. Did a ceiling really fall on her? And was she hurt?
Juries can understand this stuff.
Finally we met the plaintiff. We also met her daughter. Through
them, we learned that Ms. Tenant, a retired telephone worker, lived in
the apartment in question. She was married, but Mr. Tenant lived in
North Carolina in a residence also owned by his wife. The city
highlighted this information because one of the requirements for
residency was no ownership of real property elsewhere. Perhaps the
judge would later instruct us that if Ms. Tenant was not entitled to reside
in the apartment, the city was entitled to drop its ceiling on her head
without compensating her for injuries. Ms. Tenant, for her part, asserted
on several occasions that she and her husband did not live together, as if
that relieved her from the non-ownership requirement. She did not offer
any details such as problems in their marriage or problems living in the
same house or separate employment opportunities. Perhaps she and her
husband did not like one another; perhaps she was defrauding the
Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD"). We
will never know.
Ms. Tenant had several grown children. Her youngest child,
studying for a masters degree in North Carolina, stayed with her from
time-to-time and was with her for several days leading up to the
accident. Apparently, the building had water damage and there were
cracks in the bathroom walls. Ms. Tenant claims that she complained
about the cracks, but that her complaints were ignored. Both she and her
daughter testified that her daughter complained to the president of the
tenant association. The ceiling was scheduled, by coincidence, for repair
on the day of the accident. No one showed up.
That evening, Ms. Tenant, her daughter, and an "aunt" (she was
really a family friend) were watching a video. Ms. Tenant went to use
the bathroom, and as she was walking out, the ceiling fell on her head.
She dropped to her knees and then on the floor. Ms. Tenant and her
daughter were adamant that she was briefly unconscious, but the
ambulance report did not indicate any loss of consciousness.
Immediately after the accident, the aunt got a disposable camera, the
daughter snapped a slew of pictures, and the two called 9-1-1. The jury
saw several of the pictures. They all showed different areas of the
bathroom covered in plaster, but there were no pictures of the
incapacitated, if not unconscious, Ms. Tenant. The ambulance came and
took Ms. Tenant by herself to St. Luke's Hospital where she was
released two hours later. Several X-rays of her body were taken, but not
of her head. When she was released sometime around midnight, she
went back to her apartment by herself.
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Ms. Tenant and her daughter both claimed that Ms. Tenant
continued to be in pain after the accident. Her neck hurt, her knees hurt,
her back hurt. At the outset of her testimony, we were led to believe that
her job at Verizon was essentially that of a dispatcher. Her story changed
quite a bit, however, and it began to sound as if her former job had her
crawling on floors one minute and climbing poles the next. As a result of
the accident, she could no longer climb poles or crawl on floors. She had
at one time enjoyed dancing during her free time (clearly not with her
husband). No more dancing for Ms. Tenant. No more kickball on family
outings. Ms. Tenant could no longer enjoy walks with her daughter.
Now, she was using a cane.
Ten days after the accident, Ms. Tenant visited a doctor whose
specialty was physical medicine. The doctor sent her for MRIs and gave
her a cane and some exercises to perform. Her doctor took us on a tour
of Ms. Tenant's injuries, referring to the MRIs and a human anatomy
model that she brought with her. She said that plaintiff had suffered a
diminished quality of life, and that this was due to the accident-if, as
the doctor said she did, one assumes that what Ms. Tenant told her when
she sought treatment was true.
Then it was time to hear the city's side.
I was fairly certain the city would have a thorough plan of attack. I
was prepared to hear that the plaintiff is a liar; she resided in an
apartment that she had no right to reside in; she owned property
elsewhere. And was the plaintiff even hurt? She had all of these pictures
with her. The bathroom was hurt; there were pictures of plaster on the
toilet, plaster in the tub, and plaster on the floor. Ms. Tenant's daughter
said she took pictures of her mother on the bathroom floor covered in
plaster, but they were not offered into evidence. The number one reason
for taking pictures was to recover damages, but the plaintiff was not
claiming property damage. Why did the city's lawyer not ask, where are
the snapshots of the plaintiff? I was prepared for the city to counter
plaintiffs claims of blacking out. I was waiting for the EMT and the
emergency room doctor to testify that she had not blacked out. After all,
no X-rays or MRIs of her brain were ordered the night of the accident.
There was no record of a blackout, and the hospital sent Ms. Tenant
home two hours after she got to the hospital. I was waiting for the city's
lawyer to ask the daughter why neither she nor the aunt accompanied
this severely injured woman to the hospital. Why did the city's lawyer
not ask Ms. Tenant how she got home?
There was none of this. Instead of attacking her credibility with
better witnesses and good cross-examination, Ms. L. kept focusing on
whether the repairs were the responsibility of the tenant association or
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not. We did not care. We had all seen who was in charge of the tenant
association, and there was no possibility that under his leadership any
repairs could be undertaken. Again, without focusing on tearing down
Ms. Tenant's story, the city called another witness, an HPD employee
who was supposed to bring in records of inspections to the roof and
repairs as well as written documentation as to who was responsible.
There were no such records, and there was no policy or contract that
relieved the city's obligation to maintain safe conditions. Ms. Tenant
said that she notified the president of the tenant association of her leaky
roof. The city presented no evidence to the contrary. As a jury, we were
given no reason to believe that the tenant association was not an agent of
the city.
Common sense suggests that the heart of the city's case lay in
damages. Was the plaintiff even injured? Her doctor specifically said she
was. And although the doctor gave off an air of credibility, it seems as if
she may be primarily a doctor whose patients are plaintiffs in personal
injury actions. The city's lawyer could have highlighted her patient
population, but instead was disrespectful. Ms. L. repeatedly referred to
the doctor's specialty as physiology as opposed to physical medicine. It
was unclear whether she was trying to make us think the doctor was an
exercise physiologist or whether the city's lawyer was just uninformed.
The city's experts were disappointing. The orthopedist who saw the
plaintiff came off as a-forgive the term---"crazy, old guy": he was
willy-nilly pulling random diagnostic instruments from a weathered
medical bag and answering questions not put before him. He had not
practiced medicine in years and instead saw patients once a week as a
paid expert for the city. For sure, he did not seem trustworthy. He
answered questions to the extent that he thought the city would be
pleased. So when the city's lawyer, in an effort to show that Ms.
Tenant's smoking habit may have contributed to her slow recovery,
asked the city's expert if smoking would have any effect, he responded
that the effect would be positive. Smoking would relax her.
Moreover, the city called another expert, another doctor engaged
solely in the practice of representing the city. His interpretation of the
MRIs contradicted that of the crazy, old guy's several times.
On several occasions, the city's lawyer asked the doctors if the
accident caused the injuries. Plaintiffs attorney objected every time, and
the judge sustained his objection every time. Why was the plaintiffs
medical expert allowed to say that the accident caused the injuries but
the city's doctors were forbidden from disputing that? Was this a
sanction for the city's failure to file papers in time?
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So we come to Wednesday evening of the second week of trial. We
stayed late to finish the doctor's testimony because the judge did not sit
on Thursdays, and she was anxious that we all get to deliberate by
Friday. She had already lost one juror due to the ridiculous length of the
case. She was not about to lose another.
Thursday night, we got a telephone call. "Don't come in, the parties
have settled."
No thank you. No good-bye party. No apologies for wasting our
time.
III.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LAWYER-JURORS' PERSPECTIVE

As jurors, our experience was disappointing-not at all the
rewarding experience the court led us to expect. But at least we came
away with a story, and potential material for an article about government
lawyering in civil litigation. The experience provides an opportunity to
reflect on why we were particularly disappointed by the city lawyer's
performance and from there, to infer what we and our fellow jurors, as
members of the public, expected of the city lawyer. The exercise may
provide an opportunity to consider how the public might answer
recurring questions about the role of city government lawyers, or
whether the public might raise different questions altogether. Or the
project may be perceived to be as tedious and unproductive as the trial
through which we sat. In thinking about whether it is worth thinking
about the jurors' perceptions of government civil litigators, we begin
with a few words about the conventional professional discussion, then
consider what jurors might add to the discussion.
A. Conventional Questions About the Civil Government Lawyer's Role
The conventional question is where to situate lawyers who
represent the government in civil matters: Are they more like
prosecutors or lawyers for private parties? Prosecutors have a special
duty to promote the fairness of the outcome of a proceeding.' While
lawyers for private parties need not trouble themselves over whether the
client deserves to win a lawsuit, prosecutors should not prosecute those
whom they believe to be innocent,9 and they have responsibilities to
avoid, and rectify, wrongful convictions.1o Prosecutors also have a
special responsibility to promote the fairness of the criminal justice
8. See supra note 2.
9. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 497-501 (2009).
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)-(h) (2009).
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process." This includes obligations, unlike those of private litigants'
lawyers, to avoid misleading the fact finder by urging it to draw unfair or
untrue inferences or by discrediting truthful testimony,' 2 and to call the
court's attention to procedural error and to opposing counsel's
inadequacy.' 3 Further, prosecutors are expected to exercise their power
with a sense of proportionality-for example, to seek outcomes that are
deserved, not necessarily the most harsh.14
There is disagreement within the legal profession about whether
government lawyers in civil litigation have exceptional obligations
comparable to those of prosecutors. The American Bar Association's
("ABA") previous ethics code equated criminal prosecutors and
government civil litigators, '5 but the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, adopted in 1983, do not preserve the idea that government
lawyers in civil and administrative proceedings have a special role.' 6
Further, at least for disciplinary purposes, the ABA's ethics committee
has taken the view that in civil cases, government litigators' duties are
like those of private litigants' lawyers.17 In contrast, courts sometimes
11. See supra note 3.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing that "a
federal prosecutor has a special duty not to impede the truth" and it is therefore "improper for the
government to present to the jury statements or inferences it knows to be false or has very strong
reason to doubt"); United States v. Lusterino, 450 F.2d 572, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1971) (prosecutor may
not knowingly "participate[) in allowing a false picture to be painted" for the jury).
13. See generally Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of
the Sixth Amendment" if You're Trying to Put that Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
997 (2000) (discussing whether prosecutors are required to intervene if they feel a defendant is
being poorly represented by his counsel).
14. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2117, 2128 (1998).
15. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), Ethical Consideration
7-14, provided:
A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain
from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer
not having such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy
submitted to him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoidance of unfair
litigation. A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the
responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use
his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about
unjust settlements or results.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009).
17. In ABA Formal Op. 94-387 (1994), the committee considered whether a government
lawyer who brought a claim barred by the statute of limitation could negotiate a settlement, thereby
exploiting defense counsel's evident unawareness that he could get the claim dismissed based on
this affirmative defense. The committee recognized that a lawyer for a private client could exploit
the opposing party's ignorance or inexperience in this manner, and continued:
The Committee sees no reason to reach a different conclusion respecting the lawyer's
ethical obligations simply because she represents a governmental agency as opposed to a
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espouse the view that in civil litigation and agency proceedings, no less
than in criminal prosecutions, government lawyers have ethical and
professional duties different from those of lawyers for private parties. 18
A noteworthy expression of this view is Judge Abner Mikva's 1992
opinion for the D.C. Circuit, which emphasized that lawyers for the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had an ethical duty like that of
prosecutors to seek justice. 19 More recently, in a case in which the state
brought a civil action against lead paint manufacturers, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court distinguished the state attorney general's role from that
of the usual advocate: It stated that, like prosecutors, lawyers for the
government in civil lawsuits have an "enduring duty to 'seek justice,"'

private party. While some courts have held that ethical codes impose different
requirements of advocacy on government litigators, we find no basis in the Model Rules
for doing so, at least in the context of a noncriminal matter.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994), reprintedin AM. BAR
Assoc., FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS: 1983-1993, at 257-58 (2000) [hereinafter ABA
Formal Op. 94-387].
18. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1272-73, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting an
executive official's assertion of attorney-client privilege in the grand jury based in part on the view
that "government attorneys stand in a far different position from members of the private bar," and
observing that unlike ordinary lawyers, government lawyers have a constitutional responsibility to
faithfully execute the laws, which means that a government lawyer cannot be loyal exclusively to
his or her government agency, but must "uphold the public trust reposed in him or her"); Douglas v.
Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("As officers of this court, counsel have an
obligation to ensure that the tribunal is aware of significant events that may bear directly on the
outcome of litigation.. . . This is especially true for government attorneys, who have special
responsibilities to both this court and the public at large."); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d
23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[C]ounsel for the government, no less than their colleagues in the private
sector, are bound by the same obligations to the court. There is, indeed, much to suggest that
government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their client is not only the agency they
represent but also the public at large."); Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. U.S. Sec'y of
Labor, No. 08-102, 30 ITRD 2167, 2008 WL 4386874, at *2 n.4 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 26, 2008)
("government lawyers play a unique role in the administration of justice, and therefore have some
special duties"); Jones v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 1250, 1256-57 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[C]ounsel for
the United States has a special responsibility to the justice system. . . . Given the wholly untenable
position of the government .... the professionally responsible answer to this lawsuit would have
been a confession of error by government counsel."); EEOC v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., Inc.,
74 F.R.D. 628, 632-33 (W.D. Pa. 1977) ("True, Justice Sutherland's remarks [in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1934)] were made in the context of the role of the United States Attorney in a
criminal case; they should nevertheless apply with equal force today to the actions of federal
attorneys representing the myriad governmental regulatory and administrative agencies which have
materialized since 1934."); City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1977)
("Occupying a position analogous to a public prosecutor, [a civil government lawyer] is 'possessed
of important governmental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only,
that of impartial justice."' (citation omitted)).
19. Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45, 47
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
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arising out of their duty to represent the public interest and their
responsibility to represent the people of the state. 20
Academic commentators line up on both sides. Some argue that the
government's civil litigators play a unique role that implies
responsibilities different from those of lawyers for private clients.2 1
They maintain that the rationale for treating prosecutors differently from
ordinary advocates also applies for the most part to civil government
litigators. 22 Whether the client is the federal, state, or local government,
or a public agency, the argument goes, the client is significantly different
from a private entity or an individual. The public entity itself has unique
legal duties and objectives because its role is to serve the public. In order
to carry out the objectives of the public-entity client-including its
obligation to seek fair civil outcomes and to promote fair civil
processes-the lawyer for the public entity must proceed differently
from a private litigator.2 3 It has also been suggested that government
lawyers should play a professionally distinct role in civil litigation
because of their status as public officials.24 However, other
20. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 471-72 (R.I. 2008). These
observations were a prelude to the court's consideration of whether the state Attorney General could
retain private lawyers on a contingency fee basis to bring a public nuisance action against lead paint
manufacturers. Id. at 477. The court concluded that:
[D]ue to the special duty of attorneys general to "seek justice" and their wide discretion
with respect to same, such contractual relationships must be accompanied by exacting
limitations... . [T]he Attorney General is not precluded from engaging private counsel
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement in order to assist in certain civil litigation, so long
as the Office of Attorney General retains absolute and total control over all critical
decision-making in any case in which such agreements have been entered into.. . . In our
view, it is imperative that the case-management authority of the Attorney General, where
a contingent fee agreement is involved, be "final, sole and unreviewable."
Id. at 475-76.
21. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789, 813-29 (2000); Bruce A.
Green, Must Government Lawyers "Seek Justice" in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235,
236, 239-40, 256-63 (2000); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and PoliticalProblems ofa
Government Attorney, 18 ME. L. REV. 155, 157-58, 165, 168-72 (1966) (discussing the ethical
pressures faced by the government attorney due to "the heightened responsibility he has as a lawyer
for reform of the administration of justice and law" and "the multiplicity of services he renders, the
many departments he represents, and the fact that he represents the people as well as government").
22. Green, supra note 21, at 265-66 ("The traditional understanding reflected in decisions
such as Berger rests on three premises: (1) the government lawyer represents the sovereignty and
not a private client; (2) the sovereignty's legal obligations and objectives include 'seeking justice';
and (3) as the government's representative, the prosecutor must carry out that objective... . [T]hese
premises are generally, if not invariably, applicable to government lawyers conducting civil
litigation." (citation omitted)).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §97 cmt. f. (2000), takes a
similar position predicated on the unique obligations of the government lawyer's client.
24. Green, supra note 21, at 275-76 ("[Als a public official, the government lawyer has an
independent legal duty to faithfully carry out the law. This duty may be distinct from (and possibly,
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commentators share the ABA's skepticism,25 and raise such questions as
how government lawyers are supposed to determine what is in the public
interest, whether government lawyers are qualified to make this
determination, and whether their doing so in a civil lawsuit undermines
or usurps the role of the officials who stand in the shoes of the publicentity client, who are entrusted with the responsibility to make decisions
in the case, and who are more democratically accountable. 26
Sometimes, the question is posed, "Whom does the civil
government lawyer represent?" The expectation is that the answer will
determine the lawyer's role. But the question can push the debate in
either direction. Often, the point is that the government lawyer is not a
free agent but represents an entity (for example, a government branch or
agency) that is not meaningfully different from a private entity that
determines its objectives and directs its lawyer accordingly.27
Alternatively, the point is that the client is ultimately the "public," or at
least that the agency is a fiduciary for the public, and that the lawyer
therefore has license to promote the public interest, or the lawyer's
conception of the public interest, independently of how the public
interest is perceived by agency representatives. 28
Looking at Ms. Tenant's lawsuit, one engaged in this debate might
ask whether the city's lawyer should defend the city the same as, or
differently from, a lawyer defending a private landlord. If a tenant lives
in a privately owned building and brings a lawsuit like the one brought
by Ms. Tenant, the private landlord will ordinarily want to avoid or
minimize liability, period. Any given landlord may be exceptional-he
may have different, broader, additional, or more enlightened objectives.
at times, paramount to) the ordinary duty of a lawyer to render zealous representation.... Arguably,
at the very least, the government lawyer's constitutional duty to faithfully carry out the law restricts
the government litigator from seeking outcomes or employing methods that, in the lawyer's
independent professional judgment, are contrary to the law. Beyond that, the idea that the
professional obligation of the government lawyer transcends loyalty to the government agency
implies that the lawyer has a constitutional obligation to act based on an independent determination
of what it means to carry out the law, unconfined by the traditional lawyer's role.").
25. See, e.g., William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
Owe the Duty ofLoyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 541 (1986); Catherine J.
Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 975 (1991); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers's Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1293, 1294 (1987).
26. Professor Steven K. Berenson has sought to identify and refute these arguments. See
Berenson, supra note 21, at 802-30.
27. See Green, supra note 21, at 249 ("When the government ... is a civil plaintiff in an
ordinary dispute (e.g. a breach of contract case) or is a civil defendant, the government is arguably
no different from a private litigant.").
28.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 97

cmt. b. (2000) ("[T]he

goals of a government client necessarily include pursuit of the public interest. . . .").
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If not, the job of the private landlord's private lawyer is to win or, failing
that, to settle a tenant's personal injury lawsuit on favorable terms. The
lawyer may do whatever the law allows to achieve that objective. She
might also do some things that the law on the books does not allow
because she can get away with minor transgressions, such as asking
questions without a good faith basis or offering evidence she knows to
be inadmissible. She probably would not identify strongly with the
landlord. She would advocate without regard to her view, if any, about
what the just result would be. Her conduct would not cast much light on
the landlord, who would not be expected to control his lawyer's
courtroom conduct. If the lawyer was respectful on one hand, or
obnoxious on the other, a jury would not assume the same of the
landlord.
Particularly if the government trial lawyer's client is a civil agency
with a public official who wants to direct the representation, the
conclusion may be that the lawyer represents the public agency in
roughly the same way as a private lawyer represents a private entity. She
advises the public official and takes direction from the public official
about whether to proceed in the litigation or settle, and advocates for the
public agency's lawful objectives as communicated by the officialobjectives which, in litigation, may be limited to seeking the best
economic outcome. She would not view her role as ethically distinct
from that of a private entity's lawyer. She would just be an advocate.
It appeared that this is how the city's lawyer regarded her role in
defending Ms. Tenant's lawsuit. In her voir dire, the city lawyer asked
one of us, "Would you agree that the city has no greater responsibility
than a private landlord, and not hold the city to a higher standard?" The
premise of the question was that this was just a garden-variety tort
case-do not expect more from the city than from anyone else. But
another implication may have been, do not expect anything more from
the city's lawyer than from a private lawyer. Ms. L.'s trial conduct was
consistent with the conception of her role as indistinguishable from that
of a private landlord's lawyer-and particularly, the conduct of a lawyer
for a landlord who was seeking to limit litigation expenses in defending
what was perceived to be a small and questionable claim. There
appeared to be little pretrial discovery or preparation-there was no
indication, for example, that the city conducted any depositions. Its
lawyer certainly had not pre-marked and photocopied the city's exhibits
or taken other steps that might have streamlined the trial. The city's
expert witnesses were evidently cut rate; and much of the crossexamination consisted of innuendo. Any theory to defend the claim was
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fair game, whether or not it was supportable by the evidence, much less
true.
In contrast, if the city's lawyer analogized her role to that of a
prosecutor, she might have sought to prevail in defending the city only if
she had conducted investigation and ascertained that Ms. Tenant's claim
was legally undeserving. She might have limited her arguments to those
that seemed meritorious, in order to ensure the fairness of the process by
which the jury would decide the case. Further, she might have
considered in general whether the city had broader interests at stake
beyond winning, and pursued those interests.
B.

The Lawyer-JurorPerspective

We have offered to reflect on the role of civil government litigators
based on our experience as jurors. We were, to say the least,
disappointed, and we are confident that our disappointment was shared
by our fellow jurors. In other words, we all had some implicit
expectations of the city's lawyer that were not met. The objective of this
writing is to infer what those expectations were in order to explore
whether jurors (even lawyer-jurors), as representatives of the public,
may have useful views on the role of civil government trial lawyers.
But before we get there, one might ask, why bother? This was one
trial, and we saw only portions of the city lawyer's work in connection
with it; we were not privy to her work preparing for the trial, to
discussions at sidebar, to negotiations with plaintiffs counsel-we saw
just the tip of the iceberg. We were two legally-trained and, thus,
atypical jurors. 2 9 The city's lawyer may likewise be unrepresentative of
civil lawyers, or the trial may be unrepresentative of personal injury
cases defended by the city; personal injury cases may be
unrepresentative of government litigation; and so on. And even if we
could say anything meaningful about how the public might view
government lawyers, why take the public's expectations seriously?
Judges, prosecutors, and others legal professionals are, in many respects,
expected to resist public expectations in favor of professional
expectations, and the same might equally be true of the government's
civil trial lawyers. Thus, there are many reasons for skepticism about our
project.
One answer is that, regardless of the non-representativeness of two
jurors' expectations, our reactions as jurors may lead us to identify a
29. Further, as the footnotes to this writing reflect, one of the authors, in an academic role, has
given prior thought to the question of how civil government trial lawyers should conduct their work.
See Green, supra note 21; Green, supra note 3; Green & Yaroshefksy, supra note 9.
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different set of expectations from the conventional ones. Even if not, it is
likely that, whatever juror expectations may ultimately be, they come to
their expectations differently than commentators who debate the role of
government lawyers. During long sidebars and other long periods of
enforced rumination, we jurors thought about the lawyers' stage craft, in
part because we were told not to deliberate about the evidence, but to
keep an open mind until the evidence was all presented. As we thought
about what the lawyers were doing, we certainly did not cogitate on
whether the city's lawyer was more like a private landlord's lawyer or a
prosecutor. Neither a private landlord's lawyer nor a prosecutor was in
the courtroom to serve as the basis of implicit comparisons.
Nor would the question, "whom does the city's lawyer represent,"
have struck the jurors as a very interesting one. She obviously
represented the city. That's who she said she represented; that's who the
lawsuit was against; that's who we assumed would pay any judgment.
And the lawyer obviously made decisions for the city in the trial. There
was no one else to do so. Perhaps other city lawyers, or someone else,
made decisions leading up to the trial, and perhaps others would have to
authorize a settlement, but inside the courtroom, the city's lawyer was
calling the shots. And, needless to say, jurors would not be limited or
influenced in their thinking by prevalent theories of representation-for
example, by models of advocacy such as strong views of zealous
representation versus more public-regarding models. Whatever
(unfulfilled) expectations we had as jurors came from somewhere else.
To be sure, we jurors did not represent all jurors, and our jury did
not represent the entire public. But that may just mean that our project
should be replicated-that the profession needs to hear the reactions of
more jurors from more trials. And even if we represented just a few, it
may be worth knowing what a few disappointed members of the public
expected. While not necessarily legitimate, jurors' expectations are not
necessarily illegitimate either. That is worth debating. And even if some
members of the public have illegitimate expectations of government
lawyers, some professional response may be in order. If public
expectations need not be met, perhaps better public education is in order,
so that jurors do not walk away disappointed, and the public in general
does not walk around believing that public lawyers are doing a bad job.
This is not to suggest that jurors' perspectives are more valuable
than others, just that they may be different and may therefore add
something to the mix. Surely, academic commentators who explore the
work of government lawyers are more sophisticated and benefit from
being able to build upon existing literature and data. Judges'
expectations are entitled to special consideration, because the judiciary
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has authority to regulate the legal profession and judges see many more
cases and many more aspects of government lawyers' work than do
individual jurors. Government lawyers have the broadest perspective,
although not necessarily the most objective or detached one. They see
their own work from the inside, and understand the pressures and
incentives, and interaction with other players. Even judges have a
comparatively limited experience by comparison. In contrast, jurors
react to a single anecdotal experience of limited aspects of a single
government lawyer's work.
What do jurors bring to the table? At least three things. First, we
bring our own implicit expectations of how the city should act and how
its lawyers should act. Our responses to the city lawyer's trial conduct
provides an occasion to make those expectations explicit, and perhaps an
occasion that is more genuine, or at least more contextual, than a public
opinion poll in which questions are abstract. Second, we have a stake, as
residents and taxpayers of the city, in how the city ultimately represents
the public in a fiduciary sense. That makes our expectations more than a
matter of curiosity. Third, we bring the same common sense and
experience that make us valuable as jurors deliberating on the evidence.
We do not mean to suggest that many or most government lawyers
conduct their work like the lawyer we observed. Although we began
with the story of our trial, our project is not a descriptive one. In fact, our
overwhelming experience remains that government lawyers are
generally skilled and dedicated, and that they deserve to be honored for
their public service. Further, we have no reason to doubt the ordinary
excellence of the one lawyer whose work we observed. For all we know,
Ms. L. filled in at the last minute for a sick colleague and did her best
under difficult conditions. We have no comment on how government
lawyers generally behave. Our point is simply that seeing a government
lawyer at work can trigger reflections, comments, and intuitions that
reveal one set of public expectations about government lawyers' role.
While expectations thereby intuited are not invariably legitimate, they
may provide a different perspective-and one that presumptively is
entitled to be taken seriously if not necessarily accepted. Ultimately,
readers can decide for themselves whether our perspective adds anything
to the conversation.
IV.

"REPRESENTING" THE CITY, FROM THE JURY'S PERSPECTIVE

The city's lawyer told the jury that she represented the city. The
concept of "representation" is ambiguous, or at least multifaceted.
Lawyers represent clients as their agents. Lawyers represent clients in
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litigation as their advocates. Does representing the city in civil litigation
mean more?
Certainly, we saw the city's lawyer as an advocate for the city. She
"represented" the city in that sense. But we saw a stronger identity
between the city lawyer and the city as client. She was a city official.
She decided for the city; she spoke for the city; she was employed by the
city in a highly responsible position. No city official sat by her side
whispering to her what to do. For unexplained reasons, the plaintiffs
lawyer parked his client on the uncomfortable benches in the back of the
courtroom rather than in the more comfortable chair beside him (making
us wonder whether her injuries could be as bad as all that). But there was
still an identifiable client on the plaintiffs side. As far as we could tell,
the city's lawyer had no one but a junior assistant to confer with. Heaven
forbid the agency representatives who testified at the trial should have
responsibility for making decisions.
The city's lawyer represented the city in that little piece of the
public square known as the courtroom, just as the Mayor and other high
ranking city officials represent it in the broader public sphere. The jury
did not view the plaintiffs lawyer as the plaintiffs public face. The
plaintiffs lawyer, sitting at counsel table, was separated from his client
not only physically but by class, education, expertise, and role. They
were distinct. But the city's lawyer was the city's public face.
As the public face of the city, the city's lawyer appeared to carry a
different burden from that of the plaintiffs lawyer. Think of how your
mother worried about whether you brushed your hair and dressed
respectably when you went out in public, even though she did not care
about how other people's kids looked. Why did she want you to tuck
your shirt in your pants, not look like a slob? Because when you went
out in public, you "represented" her and the rest of your family, albeit
not in an agency or advocacy sense. Your slovenliness would reflect
poorly on all of them. So it was the same with the city lawyer. For better
or worse, her conduct reflected on the city administration. Similarly, to
us, "representing" the city had a different meaning than representing a
private individual. The city lawyer is more than just an advocate and
agent. She is a part of the city who represents the whole.
Further, as the city's public face in the courtroom, the city's lawyer
was not just a "hired gun" who may or may not believe what she was
saying 30 and, likewise, whose client may or may not know, care, or

30. See MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2009) ("A lawyer's representation of a
client ... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.").
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believe what she is saying, and whose function was exclusively the
narrow one of trying to win the case for the client. When a government
lawyer, who is a government official, speaks on behalf of the
government in a courtroom, which is a public forum, the public does not
view her statement as mere advocacy, but as a statement of official
government position. 31 In general, her conduct of the proceedings is
conduct of the city, not just advocacy on behalf of the city. Members of
the public chosen as prospective jurors are watching their city
government in action. We expected no sincerity from the plaintiffs
lawyer; had he displayed any warmth toward his semi-exiled client, we
would not have taken it seriously.32 But we expected sincerity, not mere
displays of advocacy, on the part of the city's lawyer.
We expected more from the city administration and its lawyer than
we expected from the plaintiffs lawyer. Jurors are not uninterested
when the city is a party. The city government worked for us. It is our
city. We take pride in it. We pay taxes to the administration to run it. We
had high expectations-that the city administration runs the city
effectively, efficiently, and fairly. If a private landlord's lawyer did a
poor job, we would not care about the landlord or the lawyer or think
that the lawyer's performance had much to say about the landlord,
assuming we did care about him. But we cared about how the city's
lawyer represented the city. We expected her to take her job seriously; to

3 1. Consequently, the government may fairly be criticized for assertions it makes in its legal
papers. For example, in The New York Times, a recent editorial addressed legal arguments made by
government lawyers in defending the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, which
authorizes states to disregard same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions and denies federal
benefits to same-sex couples. Editorial, A Bad Call on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at
A20. Viewing the arguments as not mere advocacy but as statements on behalf of the
administration, the editorial took the administration to task for analogizing gay marriages to
incestuous ones. Id.
32. Wholly apart from our legal training, we had seen enough lawyers on television, as had all
the other jurors, to have a sense that trial lawyers do not necessarily believe what they are saying. In
any event, this is scarcely a recent public revelation. As Boswell recounted his conversation with
Dr. Johnson:
Boswell: "But, sir, does not affecting a warmth when you have no warmth, and
appearing to be clearly of one opinion, when you are in reality of another opinion, does
not such dissimulation impair one's honesty? Is there not some danger that a lawyer may
put on the same mask in common life, in the intercourse with friends?" Johnson: "Why
no, sir. Every body [sic] knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client; and it
is, therefore, properly no dissimulation: the moment you come from the bar you resume
your usual behaviour. Sir, a man will no more carry the artifice of the bar into the
common intercourse of society than a man who is paid for tumbling upon his hands will
continue to tumble upon his hands when he should walk on his feet."
JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 168'(1830).
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serve with dignity; to do a good job-in short, to represent our city
well. 1
V.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT WELL?

The jury had a number of expectations of the city's lawyer. The
most basic expectation was that the lawyer will perform her job
competently and diligently. But not only because we wanted our city to
be well represented.
As jurors, we wanted to do our own job well, and we counted on
the city's lawyer to help us to do so. No one expected anything from the
plaintiffs lawyer. If he was one-sided, or mildly deceptive, we
understood that as his job. We were only mildly annoyed. But we looked
to the city's lawyer to bring out the truth, the whole truth, not to offer
bogus, unprovable suppositions through innuendo-laden crossexamination. Our failed expectation was implicit in our disappointment
in her. The city's lawyer did not present any independent evidence, but
essentially just put the plaintiff to her proof. Her opening offered no
plausible theory of the defense other than wait-and-see. She never
offered an alternative version of events-that the ceiling never really
fell; that if it did, it never landed on the plaintiffs head; that if it did, it
did not really injure her; that if it did, it was not the city's fault, it was
her own. The cross-examination suggested all these possibilities but
developed none of them. We did not want to decide the case on burden
of proof. We wanted to know what happened, and we wanted the city's
lawyer to help us figure that out.
Second, we thought that the city's job, when its tenant claims that
the ceiling of a city-owned apartment fell on her head, is not just to
challenge the plaintiff to prove her claim. We had not yet been instructed
on the law-but until then, we thought that if the city's failure to
maintain its building resulted in injury to a tenant, the city should
compensate her. The testimony of a city agency representative and the
conduct of the defense seemed designed to cast doubt on that legal
proposition,34 but we were not at all persuaded. A private landlord might
33. Ms. L.'s voir dire did not consider that the jury took pride in the city, but the opposite.
Evidently assuming that we might be victims of the city as a bad actor, she asked whether we had a
bad experience with the city and held a grudge that we would take out against it when we decided
the lawsuit. The question we would rather have heard was: "Would you unfairly favor the city
because you are a taxpaying resident of it?"
34. In part, the city lawyer's cross-examination implied that the city would have no duty in
this situation. Her theory seemed to be that it was the problem of the tenant association. We found
this bewildering. The tenant association was said to play the role of managing agent. Whose agent?
The city's. The tenant association did not own the apartment; it surely could not pay a judgment.
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contest liability even in the face of a meritorious claim if that was
consistent with his individual sense of social responsibility. He might
make the cost of prosecuting the claim high, to extract an unjustly low
settlement. But if the law calls on the city to give just compensation to
tort victims, its job is to do so.3 5 This means that the city's lawyer and
her colleagues had a responsibility to arrange for fair compensation if
they concluded that the city acted negligently and injured the plaintiff.36
Conversely, we thought that if the city had not acted wrongfully or
had not injured the plaintiff, the city's lawyer should put on an effective
defense. 37 She should play to win, not defend half-heartedly. She should
show and tell the jury why the city was not liable. She should not settle,
not even for nuisance value. To do so would unjustly reward people for
no good reason, encourage more bogus lawsuits, and pay out our tax
dollars where there was no legal necessity for the expenditure.
These understandings were implicit in our frustration at the city's
weak defense to a weak claim. There were so many reasons for
skepticism about the plaintiffs claim. But the city's lawyer had no
discernable theory of defense. Is that because the city's lawyers
recognized that the claim was just, even if the plaintiffs lawyer was
mediocre and lacked adequate resources to do a good job? Or was that
because the city had not cared to do its homework? We could not tell.
Why did the city's lawyer not present the city's side of the story?
Maybe this was just bad lawyering. We can imagine at least two possible
reasons. First, the New York City Law Department's Tort Division
divides up responsibility for defending a lawsuit among different city
lawyers: one may write the papers, one may conduct discovery, and the
trial lawyer may come in at the end. The trial lawyer in this case may
simply have grabbed the file on the morning of jury selection and not
fully understood the case. But we doubt that is the whole story, or much
of it, because the trial proceeded so slowly that she had plenty of time to
catch up. Rather, it appeared to us that whoever had responsibility at the

Did the city really mean to suggest that it was not ultimately responsible to maintain the building?
The housing department representative implied that the tenant association was equivalent to a
developing democracy; that if the tenant failed to secure the necessary repairs, that was the result of
her and her co-tenants democratic failings; and besides, what does she expect? She's getting a great
deal, a chance to own an apartment for $250. For that, she expects her ceiling to stay up?
35. See ABA Formal Op. 94-387, supra note 17 ("It may be that the government client itself
has duties to members of the public and to the justice system generally .... ).
36. See id. ("[T]he government lawyer retains the right and may have a duty. . . to advise her
client respecting obligations the client may have towards the court and opposing parties, and may
discuss whether its goals are 'fair' or 'just."').
37. See id. ("The government lawyer has no less a duty zealously to represent her client
within the bounds of the law than does a lawyer representing a private litigant.").
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discovery phase had not discovered anything either through independent,
informal investigation or through depositions.
Another possible explanation is that the city treats tort claims the
way an insurance company might-purely from an economic
perspective without regard to the justness of individual claims. The Law
Department has a portfolio of personal injury cases. It would be
economically rational to seek to minimize the city's liability, including
its litigation expenses, in the aggregate. If so, it might be rational not to
sink money into defending small cases. The city might settle the just
claims for less than their actual value, because plaintiffs' counsel will
want to minimize their own litigation costs and avoid the risk of losing.
The city might settle unjust claims for more than the nothing they are
worth, to avoid litigation costs. It will do justice wholesale, not retail.
And it will play catch up in the exceptional little case that does not settle
but goes to trial. Ms. Tenant's case may have been such a case.
But sitting in the jury box, we were offended by the Law
Department's apparent indifference to the case prior to trial, whether out
of incompetence or strategy. If the city has a two-fold obligation of
fairly compensating just claims and rejecting unjust ones, even if the
case is small potatoes, then the city's lawyers have to do their
homework. They have to investigate and educate themselves about the
facts of the case. They have to decide in advance what happened.
Assuming the Law Department had not done its homework, we
were offended. We did not want to sit through a trial that was just a
discovery process-a prelude to a settlement that could have been
achieved without a trial if the city had conducted ordinary investigation
and discovery. That is an abuse of our time. We eventually were told
that the city settled the case for $75,000. If you add in the court's time
and jurors' time, the process probably cost far more than if the city had
assessed its case before trial and made a decision-either the lawsuit
was meritorious, and should be settled at a fair price, or it was not, and
should be seen through to verdict. In a sense, the city shifted its litigation
costs to the jury.
If the Law Department had done its homework, which seems
unlikely, then why did the city settle just before summations? Perhaps
the plaintiff was seeking an unfairly high amount. Perhaps the city's
lawyer thought the claim was unjust, but was worried that the jury would
reach the wrong conclusion. If so, surely that was not because she found
fault with the jury she spent two days selecting, doubting our capacity to
decide the case fairly. We were well-educated and attentive. She may
have doubted the outcome because her case had not gone in well, but
that was her fault, not ours.
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Two final points: First, the city's lawyers should promote the
administration of justice.38 That is an essential government function, and
the city's lawyer represents the city. One aspect of that obligation is that
the city's lawyer should promote the obligation of citizens to serve on
juries. We were frustrated by Ms. L.'s approach to voir dire-basically
encouraging prospective jurors to say that they could not be fair. We
were also disappointed in her conduct of the trial, which we thought
reflected disrespect for our time. Those chosen for the jury were among
the few prospective jurors who were ready and willing to serve. Contrary
to the movie we were shown on the first day of jury service, we did not
come away feeling that we had a valuable experience. We had no
closure; we were never thanked; we did not see why the trial was
necessary in the first place. Nothing about the process would have led
the eight of us to want to serve again or to encourage others to do so.
Second, the city's lawyer should help the city clean up its messes.
Lawsuits often reveal problems-ranging from potholes that need to be
filled to personnel who need to be retrained or fired. This one revealed
failures in a city program: the housing department's TIL program. There
was no serious dispute that the plaintiffs building was in disrepair. It
seemed plain that the building was not inspected and repaired over a
significant stretch of time, that the city failed to keep records, or both.
The agency official in charge of the building came across as a buffoon.
We were frustrated that the city's lawyer never acknowledged these
problems, but cross-examined the housing department's representative
as if he and his agency were doing an exemplary job. Of course we have
no way to know whether the city's lawyer called the problem to the
agency's attention, but her solicitude toward the witness suggested
otherwise.
As jurors, we wanted the Law Department to call the city's
attention to the problem in its housing department. The agency might not
otherwise find out, since the problems were unlikely to have been
revealed but for the litigation. Implicitly, we believed that being a
representative of the city in a broad sense calls for a responsibility
beyond the advocacy role. Again, this was a matter of common sense
and experience, not theory. If a cashier in a grocery store saw a puddle
on the floor or a leak in the roof, she might not be responsible to clean it
up or repair it, but the grocery store owner and its customers would
expect her to report it. Surely, the Law Department and its individual
lawyers have some comparable responsibility to put the relevant city
38.

See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980) ("A government lawyer in

a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice . . . .").
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officials on notice of the city's messes-in this case, to point out the
housing department's evident mismanagement.

VI.

CONCLUSION

From our seats in the jury box, government lawyers in civil
litigation do have a distinct role and special responsibilities. In the end,
our expectations may not differ from those of commentators who
analogize civil government lawyers to prosecutors. But our expectations
are not derived from theory, but from common sense and experience as
members of the public, city residents, and taxpayers. From our
perspective, the government lawyer is the government's public face as
well as its advocate and agent. She should do in court what we expect
the government to do generally. This includes offering fair settlements
of just claims and vigorously defending against unjust ones, not just
making economically rational decisions in the aggregate. This includes
promoting respect for the judicial process by respecting the jurors, their
role as jurors, and their time. This includes calling attention to
dysfunctions in other city agencies that are exposed by the litigation. Or,
to put it differently, government lawyers should tuck in their shirts, do
their homework, and help clean up the city's messes.
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